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GOT WHEELS? ARTICLE 2A,
STANDARDIZED RENTAL CAR TERMS,
RATIONAL INACTION, AND UNILATERAL
PRIVATE ORDERING
Irma S. Russell*
I. RENTING A CAR: SIGN HERE
The standard form contract in consumer deals is one of the most
controversial issues of modem contract law.' Standardized contracts,
or form contracts, are sometimes referred to by the pejorative name
"contracts of adhesion."2 Nevertheless, mass-produced contracts are
as much a fixed reality in the modem market as mass production and
mass marketing,3 and the law affords standardized contracts the same
deference accorded bargained-for-exchanges. Thus, absent a finding
of unconscionability, deals constructed by the dominant party are
enforced without bargaining and without judicial scrutiny.' The
rationale for use of the unconscionability standard and the deference
it creates is a concept of utility that considers some cumulative cost
savings to consumers as a group while ignoring other costs-such as
aggregate losses to consumers The result is a presumption of free
* Professor of Law and Director, National Energy-Environmental Law & Policy Institute
(NELPI). Professor Russell expresses appreciation for the comments and suggestions of many
friends and colleagues on various versions of this article, especially Diane Parrish and Professors
Gregory M. Duhl, Janet Levit, Nancy Levit, and Janet L. Richards. She thanks Jeri Flemming,
Eric Neimeyer, Michael Neimeyer, Melanie D. Nelson, and Daniel M. Phillips for their research
assistance and notes appreciation to Leonard H. Sansanowicz for editorial suggestions.
2. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 627-28
(2002) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943)); see Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See 21 C.J.S. Consumer Protection § 24 (2006).
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bargaining that endorses a system of contracts dictated by the
dominant party in consumer transactions.'
Few people actually read the terms and conditions of the form
contracts they enter. Indeed, it would be a waste of time to read
contract terms when it is clearly not possible to change them. Thus,
a consumer's decision not to read a form contract is rational inaction
or efficient inertia since bargaining is not a real possibility and the
transaction is dictated by the dominant party. These transactions are
bilateral only in the sense that they are supported by consideration;
otherwise, they amount to unilateral private ordering of terms
imposed by the dominant party. In general, Article 2A of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)7 and modem contract law accept
such unilateral private ordering by drafters of form contracts.8
Judicial oversight of standardized contracts is limited to a patchwork
of specific consumer statutes 9 and the amorphous test of uncon-
scionability. ° The presumption that form contracts present the same
social utility associated with mass production-the standard
justification for such arrangements-accepts the process as a
cumulative good and eschews scrutiny of the terms of any given
deal.' Explaining the merits of standardization, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 211 notes that legal rules "which
would apply in the absence of agreement can be shaped to fit the
particular type of transaction, and extra copies of the form can be
used for purposes such as record-keeping, coordination and
supervision.' 1 2  Section 211 concludes that the net result of such
mass contracting is that "[o]perations are simplified and costs
reduced, to the advantage of all concerned."' 3
6. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1207 & 1284 (2003) (arguing that standard forms
favor drafters and that mandatory contract terms and modification of the unconscionability
doctrine could reduce inefficiencies resulting from form contracting).
7. U.C.C. art. 2A (2003).
8. See Korobkin, supra note 5.
9. See infra Part M.A.
10. SeeU.C.C. § 2A-108 (2003).
11. Section 211 of the Restatement articulates the conventional justification for form
contracting and asserts that standardization of agreements has utility for society and that, like
standardization of goods and services, it is "essential to a system of mass production and
distribution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
12. Id.
13. Id.
GOT WHEELS?
Article 2 of the UCC facilitates unilateral private ordering by
endorsing a policing standard of unconscionability rather than
applying a reasonableness standard. 4 None of the protections of
Article 2A alters the central fact that courts do not consider
bargaining power when assessing unconscionability. 5 Ignoring the
issue of bargaining power in most situations, Article 2A thus
provides scant protection for consumers in the context of leasing
personal property.1
6
This Article considers the system of unilateral private ordering
by form contracts: the presumptions of a free market and free
bargaining. It questions whether the system of constrained judicial
oversight that serves to insulate bargaining from governmental
control, should extend to standardized consumer contracts that
emphatically dispense with bilateral ordering. It also questions
whether the unilateral private ordering presented by standardized
contracts effects a cost savings for society, a construct with
apparently universal acceptance today. 7 This Article considers the
application of Article 2A to standard form contracts in the most
common consumer leasing transaction-renting a car." Part II
discusses the importance of default rules and presumptions in the law
and focuses on contract law as an example. Part III examines rental
car agreements and provisions of Article 2A that apply to consumer
leasing. Part IV discusses the treatment of form contracts by the
common law and the UCC. Part V explores the doctrine of
unconscionability as it applies to form contracting. Part VI examines
14. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003) ("Courts have been particularly vigilant when the
contract at issue is set forth in a standard form."). The UCC also makes clear that bargaining
power is not the issue: "The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." Id.
15. No UCC provision that provides protection to lessees references differences in
bargaining power as a relevant consideration. See,e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2A-106, 2A-108(2), 2A-108(4),
2A-109(2), 2A- 221, 2A-309, 2A-406, 2A-407, 2A-504(3)(b), 2A-516(3)(b).
16. Article 2A does not use the terms "bargaining power" or "bargaining leverage." See
generally U.C.C. art. 2A. In defining consumer leases, UCC Section 2A-101 states: "Many
leasing transactions involve parties subject to consumer protection statutes or decisions. To avoid
conflict with those laws this Article is subject to them to the extent provided in (Section 2A-
104(l)(c) and (2)). Further, certain consumer protections have been incorporated in the Article."
Id. § 2A-101 cmt.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) (asserting that form
contracting reduces costs "to the advantage of all concerned").
18. See Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform
Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 649 (2003) ("The great bulk of goods leased to
consumers are motor vehicles.").
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the historical basis for a lenient standard for contract formation and
questions whether extension of the lenient or "hands-off' approach is
justified for standardized contracts that amount to unilateral private
ordering. Part VII concludes that form contracts for the lease of
goods give substantial leeway to lessors, which strengthens the
economic power of corporate entities without a corollary social
benefit.
II. DEFAULT TERMS 1N CONTRACTING
Legal principles present a structure of law that is most beneficial
for serving the public interest. 9 The law sets general rules cabined
by exceptions, which allows the judiciary to reach different results in
different cases.2" For example, a well-known contract law doctrine
provides expectation damages to make the plaintiff whole. In the
ordinary case, however, substitutional relief rather than specific
performance is granted, in effect, setting a hurdle for the party that
seeks specific performance.2 Legal norms set a framework of
burdens of proof and burdens of going forward with evidence in the
event of a dispute.2 The plaintiff who seeks specific performance
must establish not only the breach and injury but also the inadequacy
of damages in his case. 3 Thus, general rules express a preference for
a certain outcome absent extraordinary circumstances. The plaintiff
must establish that the status quo should be changed. After all, the
the essence of every plaintiffs claim asks the court to use the force
of government to change the status quo.24
Default standards permeate every area of contracting. For
instance, the UCC limits economic consequential damages a buyer
may recover to losses "resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise." 5 In this way, the UCC sets the default rule that
19. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 389, 398 (1993) (describing a function of contract law as protecting parties
from exploitation).
20. Id. ("Contract law.., contains a number of rules that parties are free to change.").
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c.
22. See id. § 360 cmt. b.
23. Id.
24. See id. cmts. b, c.
25. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2003).
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the only recoverable consequential damages are those that could not
have been prevented by cover or some other measure. While the
principle of consequential damages presents a judgment regarding a
reasonable measure in the ordinary case, it may be changed by the
parties.26 Nothing in this standard suggests that unilateral change of
a default has social utility. To the contrary, the existence of the
default as a rule suggests that it presents a reasonable balance in the
ordinary case and should be retained absent specific justifying
circumstances, such as true negotiation between the parties.
In form contracting, the party who drafts the form can
unilaterally change the default set by the law without giving up
anything in exchange. 27 Restatement drafters and scholars recognize
that parties do not read form contracts and as a result, are not likely
to secure a change in terms.28 While the practice of failing to read
form contracts is attributed to consumer reliance on the good will of
the corporate drafters of the terms, it is also a good example of
efficient inertia. One may as well rely on good will when one is
powerless to change the terms of the contract.29 Nevertheless, the
asserted utility of form contracts is the ability to transpose any and
all non-mandatory default rules, limited only by the lenient test of
unconscionability.3 Section 211 of the Restatement presumes that
reshaping contract rules is a social good." In its discussion of the
usefulness of form contracts, the Restatement states: "Legal rules
which would apply in the absence of agreement can be shaped to fit
the particular type of transaction."32  Many of the form contracts
reviewed exclude economic consequential damages entirely, thus
"reshaping the legal rules" in the terms of the Restatement 211. In
this way, the standard form contract is a free rider on the broad
presumption of a free bargain. Without the presumption of a free
bargain, courts would apply a reasonableness or fairness test to the
26. See id. § 2-715(2)(a) cmt. ("Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of
consequential damages has available the section on contractual limitation of remedy.").
27. See generally Barnett, supra note 2.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b.
29. See Barnett, supra note 2.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c.
31. Id. § 211 cmt. a.
32. Id. See discussion infra Part IV.B for further treatment on this part of the comments to
Restatement § 211.
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asserted promise.33 Whether such reshaping of rules results in a
social good depends on the substance of the modification.
Contract law employs an intentionally lenient standard regarding
the question of whether parties have entered an enforceable
contract.34 The test of consideration allows courts to give effect to
commitments without assessing the value of the commitments.35 In
other words, consideration tests the fact of agreement rather than the
content of the agreement. Contract law recognizes that resource
maximization stimulates a robust market in promises for future
performance and, accordingly, serves the public good. The doctrine
of consideration makes it unnecessary for courts to judge the value of
an exchange. The doctrine of consideration achieves this goal by
ignoring the content of a contract and enforcing the deal when parties
intended to enter an enforceable agreement. Thus, it protects
contracting as an activity rather than judging the value of
performances.
36
This general default is set forth in Restatement section 71,
entitled "Requirement of Exchange; Types of Exchange."37 It states:
"(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
"138promise.
Restatement section 71 indicates that courts should not judge a
disputed obligation by a standard of fairness or reasonableness.39
Rather, courts should enforce an obligation when the proponent
convinces the court that the contract is a bargained-for-exchange
supported by consideration.4" The standard of consideration endorses
a free market because it refrains from valuing the performance or
promise that constitutes the consideration. It emphasizes the
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c.
34. See id. § 71.
35. See id. § 71 cmt. c ("Ordinarily... courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration, particularly where one or both of the values exchanged are difficult to measure.").
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
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bargain of the parties by defining a bargain as the exchange that
occurs when the performance or promise "is sought by the promisor
in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise. 42 Under this standard, a court does not
judge the value of the bargain or the components of performance.43
Rather, the court judges the existence of a bargain." Section 71
clarifies the broad reach of the concept of consideration by noting the
types of exchanges that serve as consideration: "(3) The performance
may consist of (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance,
or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation."45
The section also makes clear that the consideration does not need to
be provided solely to the party to the contract, but rather "may be
given to the promisor or to some other person." 46 This mechanism
broadens the universe of performances that meet the requirement of
consideration.
The comment to Restatement section 71 emphasizes the point of
the broad nature of the requirement created by the objective standard
of assent: "[T]he law is concerned with the external manifestation
rather than the undisclosed mental state: it is enough that one party
manifests an intention to induce the other's response and to be
induced by it and that the other responds in accordance with the
inducement. 4 7 A free market means that parties are free to choose a
deal that the court-or individual judges who make up the court-
would see as valueless. The test for enforceability of a deal in the
ordinary case is not fairness or reasonableness; it is whether the deal
is supported by consideration.48
Any judging or valuing of the content of the agreement
compromises the freedom of the contracting parties.49 If the parties
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 71 cmt. b ("[A] mere pretense of bargain does not suffice.").
48. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hogan, Note, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which
Types of Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 431 (2006)
(explaining that some believe employee restrictive covenants are not needed because they can
restrict free-market competition).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c ("[Social functions of bargains]
would be impaired by judicial review of the values so fixed.").
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freely bargain for a contract, the contract is enforceable--even if the
judge sees the subject matter of the contract as silly or entirely
without value." For example, consider the purchase of a paper cup
for a significant sum of money because Elvis allegedly drank from
the cup. A court might regard this contract as ridiculous;
nevertheless, parties are free to accord this item value and to bargain
for it in a free market. Thus, contract law accepts the adage that one
man's trash is another's treasure. The presumption of a free bargain
insures that courts minimally police contracts, limiting the end
product only when the result is so extreme that it is unconscionable.5
The importance of the law's choice to reject an approach that
evaluates contract fairness can hardly be overstated. Scholars note
that such regulation would be contrary to the principles of free
competition that underlie the capitalist economy of the United
States.5 A system in which the state actively monitors contracting
through its courts is indicative of a state-controlled or state-planned
market. Thus the test of consideration perfects the design for a free
market economy. 3
III. RENTING A CAR
Renting a car is the most common lease of personal property for
consumers as a group. 4 The experience cuts across all economic
sectors of the public. The car rental business is more national in
nature than other types of leasing of personal property, and use of
form contracts in car rental transactions is wide-spread. 5 A survey
of the rental car industry indicates that the car rental market is
50. Id.
51. The meaning of unconscionability itself has undergone dramatic changes in recent years,
considering that courts have upheld arbitration agreements that impose substantially unequal
terms on consumers. For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., Judge Easterbrook upheld an
arbitration clause although it required the consumer to arbitrate a dispute with the Gateway
computer company in Chicago. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). The consumer in that case had
not had an opportunity to read the terms of the contract prior to obtaining the product. Id. at
1148.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8 introductory note ("The common
law policy against restraint of trade is one of its oldest and best established.").
53. See RESTATEMENTid. § 71 cmt. c ("[Tihe social functions of bargains include the
provision of opportu-nity for free individual action.").
55. Currently, the top ten rental car companies all use form contracts. See Table 1 for a list
of these companies and their respective websites.
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controlled by national firms. Each company employs a set form of
terms and conditions for all of that company's transactions on a
nation-wide basis. 6 While renting a car is discretionary for people in
some situations, others are without options, particularly when public
transportation is not available. In the day-to-day reality of the work
world, the use of a car, like a computer, is far from a luxury and is a
necessity for many people. Determining the content of various form
agreements presented by car rental companies involves significant
time and effort for a consumer. Moreover, many consumers cannot
afford to spend the time to read these car rental form contracts. This
context also provides a case study of the relationship of consumers to
repeat players in the market. Car rental contracts are a good example
of the form contracting that is subject to Article 2A of the UCC.
A. Application of Article 2A to the Car Rental Context
Article 2A is the law regarding the leasing of personal property
in all states except Louisiana. 7  It applies to consumer leases. 8
Although Article 2A is not designed as consumer-protection
legislation, some of its provisions restrict the types of clauses a
dominant party can include. 9 Article 2A defines a consumer lease as
"a lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing or
selling makes to a consumer. "60 States have the option of including a
dollar cap in their definition of a consumer lease.61 While a state
may make any changes it chooses, accepting or rejecting any part of
the uniform law, Article 2A drafters expressly encourage states to set
a cap on consumer leases that is high enough to include car rentals
within the provision. Clearly, rental car contracts should come
within the ambit of Article 2A.62 In a legislative note, the UCC's
drafters made this point expressly:
56. For information on fleet numbers and rental revenue for the listed car rental companies,
see 2005 U.S. Car Rental Market: Fleet, Locations, and Revenue by Market Segments, AUTO
RENTAL NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 40, available at http://www.fleet-central.com/am/tpop-pdf
.cfm?action=stat&link=http://www.fleet-central.com/arn/stats/2005/U.S._CarRentalMarket
.pdf.
57. 21 C.J.S. Consumer Protection § 24 (Supp. 2006).
58. U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (2003).
59. Id. ("[C]ertain consumer protections have been incorporated in the Article.").
60. Id. § 2A-103(l)(f).
61. Id. § 2A-103 legislative note.
62. Id.
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Present Article 2A has a bracketed provision allowing
States to insert a dollar cap on leases designated as
consumer leases, amended Article 2 defines "consumer
contract" and does not include a dollar cap in the definition.
Some States have not included a dollar cap in present
Article 2A and States which have adopted a dollar cap have
stated varying amounts. If a State wishes to include a dollar
cap, the cap should be inserted here. Any cap probably
should be set high enough to bring within the definition
most automobile leasing transactions for personal, family,
or household use.63
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code used Article 2
rather than Article 9 as the "appropriate statutory analogue" for
Article 2A. The comment to the first section of Article 2A notes the
drafters' recognition that Article 2 and Article 9 of the UCC are
predicated upon "very different assumptions." The assumptions of
Article 9 include one of great interest to this particular inquiry: that
"obligations between the parties are essentially unilateral; and
applicable law seriously limits freedom of contract." This
assessment includes the clear implication that leases of personal
property should not ordinarily be regarded as deals that are
"essentially unilateral." Comment 1 to the section gives additional
evidence of this judgment:
The lease is closer in spirit and form to the sale of goods
than to the creation of a security interest. While parties to a
lease are sometimes represented by counsel and their
agreement is often reduced to a writing, the obligations of
the parties are bilateral and the common law of leasing is
dominated by the need to preserve freedom of contract.'
The drafters assume that leases of personal property are not
unilateral.65 Despite this reasoning and the stated goal of preserving
freedom of contract in Article 2A, the statute accepts unilateral
action by drafters of form contracts.66
Official Comment (e) of section 2A- 103 lists the rules that apply
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
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only to consumer leases.67 It expressly notes that Article 2A
"regulates the transactional elements of a lease, including a consumer
lease; consumer protection statutes, present and future, and existing
consumer protection decisions are unaffected by this Article. 68
Nevertheless, although Article 2A applies to consumer leases and
encourages states to include car rental agreements within its scope by
statement of a jurisdictional dollar amount, it is clear that the thrust
of Article 2A is not to serve as a consumer protection statute.69 The
comment notes that "[c]onsumer protection in lease transactions is
primarily left to other law."7
Section 2A also makes clear that federal and state consumer
protection statutes and past decisional law trump the default rules set
by Article 2A, meaning that consumer legislation will control in
conflicts of law.7' To emphasize the point, the comment specifically
references some examples of federal and state law that trump Article
2A, including the Consumer Leasing Act, and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code.7" Additionally, the comment to section 2A-
101 indicates that other laws relating to consumer leases take
precedence over Article 2A.73UCC section 2A-104 notes that the
statute does little to protect consumers, while also explaining the
vulnerability of consumers in lease transactions to one-sided lease
agreements.7 4  Despite this hands-off approach, the section does
include some "special rules that may not be varied by agreement in
the case of a consumer lease."75  For example, Section 2A-214
requires that specific language is used in order to exclude or modify
67. Id. § 2A-103 cmt. e.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 2A-104 cmt. 4.
71. Id. § 2A-104. Section 2A-104 states: "A lease subject to this Article is also subject to
any applicable ... rule of law that establishes a different rule for consumers." Id. The comment
to this section specifically refers to the wide swath of laws that may trump Article 2A, including
"state statutes existing prior to enactment of Article 2A or passed afterward" and "pre-existing
consumer protection decision[s]." Id. § 2A- 104 cmt. 2. Similarly, the comment notes that federal
law "controls without any statement in this Article under applicable principles of preemption."
Id.
72. U.C.C. § 2A-104 cmt. 2 ("Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667(e) (1982)
and its implementing regulation, Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213 (1986)").
73. Id. § 2A-101 cmt.
74. Id. § 2A-104 cmt. 4.
75. Id.
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warranties in consumer leases.76 Section 2A-530 prohibits a lessor
from recovering consequential damages from a consumer in a
consumer lease contract." Numerous other provisions refer to
consumer leases which include limitations on choice of law, relief
for unconscionable terms, and a prohibition against options to
accelerate at will.
78
The comment to Restatement section 211 notes that consumers
are vulnerable to overreaching by the dominant party.79 Section 2A-
106 limits the ability of the parties to change the applicable law and
judicial forum in a consumer lease. 0 It states:
(1) If the law chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is
that of a jurisdiction other than a jurisdiction in which the
lessee resides at the time the lease agreement becomes
enforceable or within 30 days thereafter or in which the
goods are to be used, the choice is not enforceable.
(2) If the judicial forum chosen by the parties to a consumer
lease is a forum that would not otherwise have jurisdiction
over the lessee, the choice is not enforceable.8'
The comment to this section notes the "real danger that a lessor may
induce a consumer lessee to agree that the applicable law will be a
jurisdiction that has little effective consumer protection, or to agree
that the applicable forum will be a forum that is inconvenient for the
lessee in the event of litigation. '82 Thus, the section invalidates a
choice of law or forum clause that does not choose the "state of the
consumer's residence or where the goods will be kept, or the
forum... that otherwise would have jurisdiction over the lessee." 3
The comment also notes the "potentially abusive choice of law
clauses in consumer leases," such as choosing a forum with little
consumer protection laws or one that is inconvenient for the
76. Id. § 2A-214(2) (quoting the language necessary to disclaim warranties including
"merchantability" and the implied warranty of fitness).
77. Id. § 2A-530(3).
78. See, e.g., id. §§ 2A-106, 2A-108, and 2A-109.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1981).
80. U.C.C. § 2A-106.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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consumer in the event of litigation.84 Interestingly, the provision
does not prohibit use of arbitration rather than judicial resolution of
disputes. It expressly states that the section "does not limit selection
of a non-judicial forum, such as arbitration."85
Section 2A-108 on unconscionability singles out consumer
leases for special treatment.86 Subsection (2) states:
With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of
law finds that a lease contract or any clause of a lease
contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or
that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection
of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court may grant
appropriate relief.
87
This section establishes the standards for setting aside a provision of
a contract as a basis for relief.8 The unconscionability standard is a
demanding standard for the plaintiff.89 The use of the standard in
section 2A-108 is enhanced further by the need for a showing of
unconscionability as a "matter of law."9 Thus, only clear cases of
unconscionability will pass the test.9
Section 2A-109, on options to accelerate payments, also deals
separately with consumer leases. 92 It construes the effect of at-will
acceleration clauses by limiting the operation of clauses
"accelerat[ing] payment[s] or performance or requir[ing] collateral or
additional collateral 'at will' or 'when the party deems itself
insecure"' only when the party has a good faith belief "that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired."93 In other words, a
party's determination to accelerate is effective only when it is based
on an honest belief of insecurity. This provision also has a separate
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 2A-108(2).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Panalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 719 (2001) (arguing that the unconscionability
standard is a "more difficult threshold"). The unconscionability standard is closely related to the
standard of outrageousness required to award punitive damages in tort law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
90. U.C.C. § 2A-108.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 2A-109.
93. Id.
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subsection dealing with the consumer lease setting. In a dispute
regarding a consumer lease, "the burden of establishing good faith
under subsection (1) is on the party that has exercised the power;
otherwise the burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against which the power has been exercised.
9 4
Subsection (4) to Article 2A-108 expressly authorizes the award
of attorneys' fees to a consumer lessee who proves unconscionability
in a consumer lease.95 The provision provides the possibility of
attorneys' fees to either the lessee or the lessor in a consumer lease.
It states that when a court finds unconscionability the court "shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to the lessee."96 It also provides for
an award of attorney's fees to the lessor in some circumstances: "If
the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee claiming
unconscionability has brought or maintained an action the lessee
knew to be groundless, the court shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to the party against which the claim is made." Thus, a consumer
who knows that the claim he is bringing is without merit may face a
verdict of attorney's fees for the lessor if the court finds the conduct
unconscionable.97 The official comment states that Subsection (4)
(b) "is independent of, and thus will not override, a term in the lease
agreement that provides for the payment of attorney's fees.""
Accordingly, the parties may allow for attorney's fees in
circumstances not covered by the provision. Some of the terms and
conditions in the documents reviewed did provide for attorney's fees
as a matter separate from Article 2A.99
B. Framework of the Study
The ordinary consumer leases goods infrequently. The most
likely area of consumer involvement in a lease of goods occurs when
a consumer rents a car.' °° Consumer leasing exists in other areas
such as the lease of furniture, tools for home repair, and rent-to-own
94. Id.
95. Id. § 2A-108(4).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 2A-108(4)(b) ("If the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee claiming
unconscionability has brought or maintained an action the lessee knew to be groundless, the court
shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the party against which the claim is made.").
98. Id. § 2A-108 cmt.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. See Table 1.
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arrangements, but rental of cars seems the area of leasing of personal
property most widely used by people at all economic levels. People
who lack the resources to own a car may rent a car to make a
necessary trip. Affluent business people rent cars after flying to
business meetings in locations distant from their offices. Compared
with other consumer leases, the rental car lease affects more con-
sumers of all economic segments and, thus, presents an area of wide-
spread interest. Additionally, the rental car industry presents a
nationwide market, providing standardized terms across the country
with respect to the contractual relations of the parties, while setting
individual pricing on a city-by-city or region-by-region basis. A few
independent car rental companies exist but the market is dominated
by ten players, each of which provides a system that is national in
nature.
The author and research assistants gathered information relating
to renting a car from the following dealers: Advantage Rent-A-Car,
Alamo, Avis, Budget, Dollar, Enterprise, Hertz, National, Thrifty,
and Payless. The study compared the terms and conditions of rental
agreements and pricing information, which consumers could obtain
before leasing a car. The study included on-site visits to the rental car
locations, telephone calls, and a review of the company websites and
printed materials. Some employees at the rental sites declined to
give a form contract. A Budget employee provided me with a
printed brochure entitled "Terms and Conditions." This employee
and others did not recognize the word "contract" as a reference to the
"Terms and Conditions" document. These employees distinguished
between the "contract" and the "terms and conditions" of the lease
by indicating that the term "contract" referred to only the lease itself.
The telephone representatives answering the toll-free calls also did
not recognize that the "Terms and Conditions" document constituted
a part of the contract. Without exception, the representatives referred
to the dickered terms as the "contract" and identified the "terms and
conditions" documents as something separate and apart from the
contract between the parties.
Comparison of the websites revealed that although the contracts
or terms and conditions varied considerably from company to
company, each rental used a standard contract form for the entire
country rather than varying it by locale. This is not surprising since
savings due to standardization would be lost if forms varied by
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region. However, a consumer visiting Hertz's website might
conclude that Hertz's terms vary from one locale to another: the
website provided a pull-down menu for each Hertz location with the
terms and conditions of that city. °10 Nevertheless, a sampling of ten
other websites revealed that all the terms under the links for different
cities were identical despite the separate pull-down windows for each
city. Copying the text of ten locales and running a "compare docs"
function for the ten sites revealed identical terms and conditions in
all the sites." 2 The pull-down document containing basic terms of
the agreement, entitled "VEHICLE RENTAL RATE QUOTES,
RESERVATIONS AND PREPAYMENTS,"'' 3 lists definitions and
explains terms such as "Rate Quotes," "Reservations," "Rental
Qualifications and Requirements," "Rates Quoted in connection with
Reservations," "Types of Rental Transactions and Reservations,
Definition of Reserving and Renting Companies," "Prepaid Rental
Transactions .... Guaranteed Reservations," and "Standby Reser-
vations."'0 4 The correspondence address is the same no matter which
location the consumer accessed.' 5 The website could have achieved
the same informational purpose by having one set of terms and
conditions available without designation of the rental location.0 6
In order to assess those terms, the author visited the car rental
agencies in person, talked with rental car agents, and compared the
form contracts provided on the Internet or in hard copy. Many of the
hardcopy forms were on flimsy paper and printed in a font size
smaller than 8-point. All of the companies had sites on the internet
though some of them did not provide full information on the terms of
the rentals available. In some cases the companies provided
information in the form of brochures.
The author called all the major car rental companies and a few
local companies to ask whether it would be possible to rent a car
101. HERTZ, VEHICLE RENTAL RATE QUOTES, RESERVATIONS, AND PREPAYMENTS (2005),
http://www.hertz.com (click on "Locations, Cars, and More;" set a location; then click on
"Qualifications & Requirements;" find "Making Reservations-Legal" and click "Go").
102. See Table 1. Copying the text of ten locales and running a "compare docs" function
revealed identical terms and conditions. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The locations included are: Chicago, Colorado Springs, Dallas-Fort Worth , Green Bay,
Los Angeles, Memphis, New Orleans, New York City JFK, Orlando, and Savannah. Id.
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without entering into the standard form agreement. In substance, all
representatives gave the expected answer: No. One representative
stated: "If you want to rent a car, you accept the terms." Some phone
representatives refused to answer the question or gave equivocal
answers such as: "Maybe you could talk with a local office in your
hometown about that." The tenor of the comments received ranged
from laughter to contemplative responses such as: "In ten years in
this job no one has ever asked me that."
The company websites vary in terms of the length of the
information (often referred to as "terms and conditions") provided to
the public. The longest is 63 pages (from Avis)." 7 The shortest is
five pages (from Advantage Rent a Car)."'8 Initially, the author
searched for the following terms on the sites: arbitration, attorney's
fees, choice of law, consequential, forum selection, integration,
liquidated, loss, merger, modification, penalty, reservation, return,
resolution of disputes, and unilateral. Many of the websites gave
general information, such as the minimum age for renters, but did not
deal with contract default rules. Some provided a Frequently Asked
Questions list but did not provide the terms of the rental policy.
C. Omissions and Alterations of the Legal Default Rules
The terms and conditions posted on the Internet did not include
provisions found commonly in other industries such as banking,
technology, and the credit card industry. Thus, the standard forms
reviewed omitted several types of terms that would give significant
advantage to the lessor. For example, the online documents do not
include forum selection clauses, acceleration clauses, or arbitration
clauses."°9 The omission of forum selection clauses and acceleration
clauses is attributable to Article 2A.'o Although the main purpose of
Article 2A is not consumer protection, it provides a certain level of
protection to consumers by disfavoring the use of certain clauses. " '
For example, section 2A-106 prohibits the use of standard forum
107. Avis Rent A Car, Avis Preferred Service Rental Transaction, United States/Canada
Terms and Conditions (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.avis.com/AvisWeb/JSP/global/en/programs/
consumer/PrefMbrGlobalTermsMiddle.jsp#Canada/United%20States.
108. See Advantage Rent A Car, Rental Policies and Special Services, http://arac.com/terms
.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
109. See Table 1.
110. See U.C.C. § 2A-106 (2003).
111. Id.
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selection clauses that select a forum that is not the lessee's
jurisdiction,"2 and section 2A-109 limits the effect of acceleration
clauses."3 However, the absence of arbitration clauses in the doc-
uments reviewed is surprising because Article 2A does not prohibit
the use of arbitration clauses in rental car agreements." 14 Consumer
advocacy groups warn consumers to watch the fine print for binding
mandatory arbitration clauses." 5
The author's review of online rental car agreements found no
arbitration clauses."6  Although the contracts reviewed do not in-
clude arbitration clauses or forum selection clauses, they do alter the
UCC and common law default rules in significant respects.
In a few cases, a rental agreement provided consumer
protections. For example, the Avis agreement set forth specific
channels for consumer appeals of company decisions regarding
112. Id.
113. Id. § 2A-109.
114. For example, the Alltel agreement provides:
ARBITRATION. ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT OR
RELATING TO THE SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT MUST BE SETTLED BY
ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, USING THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES.
INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PROCEDURE MAY BE FOUND AT
www.adr.org. EACH PARTY WILL BEAR THE COST OF PREPARING AND
PROSECUTING ITS CASE. WE WILL REIMBURSE YOU FOR ANY FILING OR
HEARING FEES TO THE EXTENT THEY EXCEED WHAT YOUR COURT
COSTS WOULD HAVE BEEN IF YOUR CLAIM HAD BEEN RESOLVED IN A
STATE COURT HAVING JURISDICTION. THE ARBITRATOR HAS NO POWER
OR AUTHORITY TO ALTER OR MODIFY THE AGREEMENT OR THESE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY SECTION. ALL CLAIMS MUST BE ARBITRATED INDIVIDUALLY,
AND THERE WILL BE NO CONSOLIDATION OR CLASS TREATMENT OF
ANY CLAIMS. THIS PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO THE FEDERAL AR-
BITRATION ACT. YOU UNDERSTAND AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BY
AGREEING TO THIS ARBITRATION CLAUSE, YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
Alltel Wireless, Terms and Conditions for Communication Services, http://www.alltel.com/
terms.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
115. For example, the National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) website warns
that binding mandatory arbitration clauses may be "buried in the fine print of a car rental contract
or an HMO enrollment form." Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, Binding Mandatory
Arbitration (BMA) Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.naca.net/images/05Agenda/
Congress%20BMA%20FAQ.pdf (last visited August 28, 2006).
116. On arbitration and the larger issue of dominance in contracting, see Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761,
762-766 (2002) (arguing that mandatory arbitration moves society towards privatization of
contract disputes, marginalizes court involvement, and increases the risk of economic influence in
dispute resolution).
GOT WHEELS?
disputes."' No statement indicated the remedy a consumer has if the
internal appeal is not resolved to the satisfaction of the consumer." 8
As Restatement section 211 predicts, changes to the default
terms are generally beneficial to the dominant party that drafted the
form, which in this case is the rental car company." 9 For example,
Budget's printed brochure entitled "Additional Terms and
Conditions of Agreement" required that the renter pay damages for
total loss when the damage makes the car "commercially
unacceptable," a term that sounds imminently reasonable.
12
9. LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE...
C. THEFT OR TOTAL LOSS OF THE VEHICLE: IN the
event of theft or damage to the vehicle which renders it
commercially unacceptable, Renter will pay Buyer its
depreciated cost of the Vehicle less any salvage value as
liquidated damages. Renter agrees that any Vehicle
sustaining over $2,500 of damages will be deemed
commercially unacceptable for purposes of this paragraph.
Any Vehicle stolen for a period in excess of 60 days will be
deemed a total loss.
This provision requires that the renter pay damages for total loss
when the damage makes the car "commercially unacceptable," a
term that sounds imminently reasonable.
The formula for the payment of damages to Budget also seems
reasonable: "depreciated cost of the Vehicle less any salvage
value." '  The parties agree that the car is "commercially
unacceptable" when the car receives damage at a certain level.
22
The terms include an agreement about the term "commercially
unacceptable," invoking the complete cash-out when the loss is over
$2,500. This clause is not related to the value of the car. Moreover,
117. See Avis Rent A Car, supra note 107 ("If you are not satisfied with the way in which we
handle your inquiry, you can contact any of the following: [providing titles, addresses and contact
information for Avis Privacy Officers].")
118. Id.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1981) (warning of the danger of
overreaching by the dominant party).
120. THE MEMPHIS LANDSMEN, L.L.C. D/B/A BUDGET RENT A CAR OF MEMPHIS / TUPELO,
ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT (2006) [hereinafter BUDGET,
ADDITIONAL TERMS].
121. Id.
122. Id.
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this clause obligates the renter to pay the full value of a car, which
has sustained minor damage. For example, even a $50,000 car is
treated as totaled if it sustains $2,501 in damage, an amount that
could result from a fender-bender. While the rental company might
waive the provision, there is nothing in the agreement that requires a
waiver based on the full value of the car.123 Although renters and
insurers are unlikely to regard this level of loss as a total loss of the
car, that is the effect of the contractual provision.
A court applying Article 2A could properly overturn this
provision only if it found the clause to be unconscionable.124 The fact
that car rental companies offer insurance mitigates the harshness of
this provision, as does the fact that those companies that include
rigorous terms may provide cheaper rates than other companies.'
25
The number and variety of factors that affect pricing and the range of
terms and conditions offered by different companies make any
connection between rigorous terms and pricing problematic. The
larger question is whether some minimum standard of reasonableness
would provide greater utility for society, considering both the
widespread benefit of low pricing and the specific burden of rigorous
terms on the individuals impacted by those terms.
In the same terms and conditions document, Budget included the
following clause relating to return of the car:
18. VEHICLE RETURN: Renter is responsible for
returning the Vehicle in the same condition as when
received, to the location and on the date specified , or
sooner if requested by Budget. FAILURE TO RETURN
THE VEHICLE TO THE SPECIFIED LOCATION ON
THE DUE DATE MAY RESULT IN A RATE CHANGE
AND WILL RESULT IN A DROP CHARGE EQUAL TO
$.75 PER MILE DRIVEN. ANY UNAUTHROIZED
DROP FEE SHOULD NOT EXCEED $1500
REGARDLESS OF MILEAGE.
2 6
123. Id.
124. See U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (2003).
125. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 531 (197 1) ("Buyer could probably obtain the same
protection less expensively by purchasing insurance to cover the risks which would be covered by
an expanded warranty.").
126. BUDGET, ADDITIONAL TERMS, supra note 120.
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Again, on a quick reading, this provision does not seem onerous. It
requires that the renter return the vehicle in the "same condition as
when received,"' 127 surely a reasonable requirement. The unusual part
of this clause is the additional requirement that the renter return the
car "sooner if requested by Budget."'128 Similarly, the Avis website
states "You agree to return the car to us in the same condition you
received it.. .You must return it sooner on our demand."' 29 These
provisions alter the dickered terms of the agreement and appear to
trump the return date by granting the lessor a unilateral right to
change the agreed return date provided in the contract. 3 ' Moreover,
the renter who ignores this provision faces a significant risk of
damages as set forth in the all-capitalized statement of rate change:
"FAILURE TO RETURN THE VEHICLE TO THE SPECIFIED
LOCATION ON THE DUE DATE MAY RESULT IN A RATE
CHANGE AND WILL RESULT IN A DROP CHARGE EQUAL
TO $.75 PER MILE DRIVEN. ANY UNAUTHORIZED DROP
FEE SHOULD NOT EXCEED $1500 REGARDLESS OF
MILEAGE."' 3 ' It is unclear from the terms and conditions whether
this penalty applies only to the due date as set in the contract or also
to the new date established when Budget requests an early return of
the car. 3 2 One reasonable reading of the terms is that the penalty in
all-caps applies only when the original "due date" is breached by
consumer. The alternative reading is also plausible, however: that
the penalty clause applies whenever the car is due, regardless of
whether the timing is set by the contract or by the request for a
sooner return by the lessor.
Another provision waives special damages that might otherwise
apply to the car lessor: "21. MISCELLANEOUS: Budget shall have
no liability for any indirect special or consequential damages arising
in connection with the furnishing, performance, or use of the Vehicle
or for any claim based upon the failure to honor a Vehicle
reservation requested by Buyer."' 3 Most form contracts waive
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Avis Rent A Car, supra note 107.
130. Id.
131. BUDGET, ADDITIONAL TERMS, supra note 120.
132. Id.
133. Id.
Fall 2006)
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:137
incidental and consequential damages. 13 4 The interesting alteration of
ordinary contract principles appears in the alteration of the obligation
that arises from a "reservation."' 35 Consumers are likely to believe
that if they have a reservation for a car, the rental company is
contractually bound to provide a vehicle on the reservation date.
Budget's terms and conditions statement alters this default.'36 The
proximity of the exclusion of liability for indirect or consequential
damages may seem to suggest that the clause excludes only remote
damages from a failure to honor a reservation, such as incidental or
consequential damages. A literal reading of this provision, indicates
that the exclusion of damages relates to any damages arising from a
failure to honor a reservation: "Budget shall have no liability for...
for any claim based upon the failure to honor a Vehicle reservation
requested by Buyer."'37
Of course the fact that a rental company has expansive rights
stated in the contract-such as a right to demand return of the vehicle
earlier than the contract date without a particular showing of need-
does not mean that companies will exercise them. Considerations of
customer goodwill and company reputation militate against
unreasonable tactics. Companies are unlikely to enforce such clauses
except in extreme circumstances such as a recall of a particular car
model for safety reasons. Nevertheless, as a matter of private
ordering, it is such interests rather than contract law that motivates
reasonableness. As section 211 of the Restatement notes, consumers
essentially "trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to
the tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly
by others similarly situated."' 38  No substantial evidence
demonstrates that car rental companies are applying provisions such
as these in onerous ways. Often, a rental company that fails to have
134. See, e.g., John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 321 (2000) (describing consequential damages exclusion as a common term
in standard form contracts).
135. BUDGET, ADDITIONAL TERMS, supra note 120 (providing a disclaimer for reservations).
136. Id.
137. Id. This provision presents a scenario from a Seinfeld episode in which a rental
company admits that Jerry has a reservation but is untroubled by the fact that it has no car
reserved for him. Jerry insists that the representative does not know the meaning of the term
"reservation." Seinfeld." The Alternate Side (NBC Television broadcast Dec. 4, 1991).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. b (1981) (calling to mind the hope
and trust in the "kindness of strangers").
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the car reserved in stock will offer the consumer a car of equal value
or an upgrade at no additional charge.'39 In some circumstances, they
will help the consumer arrange for a rental from another company. 4 '
Thus, while some contract terms as written present the possibility of
onerous results from the consumer's point of view, rental companies
often do not enforce onerous provisions. The power of reputation
and goodwill are significant forces in the market.'4' It may be that
with such powerful forces contract law is not necessary to police
these transactions. What is clear is that the current structure of the
law treats the transactions as contracts despite the absence of
bargaining over the structure of the deal.
IV. STANDARDIZATION OF CONTRACT TERMS
Some consumer legislation addresses standard form contracts
that involve consumers, but none purports to regulate form
contracting generally in the consumer context.'42 For example, laws
relating to fraud and deception in advertising and bait and switch
tactics apply to standard form contracts. 43 Antitrust laws also apply
to standard form contracts, at least in theory.'" However, consumer
statutes do not mediate the relationship of consumers and
corporations in a comprehensive or methodical manner. 45 Focusing
on the presumption of the bargain, some free market scholars would
argue that such regulation offends underlying principles of the free
market system. 46  For instance, in the arena of leasing of personal
139. Dave Downing, 6 Steps to Cheaper Car Rentals, FODOR'S TRAVEL,
http://www.fodors.comi/features/nfdisplayl .cfin?name=stt/010813_stt-carrental.cfm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2006).
140. Ed Perkins, When Hotels and Car Rental Agencies Oversell, SMARTER TRAVEL, May
11, 2006, http://www.smartertravel.com/travel-advice/hotels-car-rental-agencies.html?id= 124872.
141. See, e.g., Erin S. Dufek, The Same Uniform, a Different Team: Copycats Suit up for
Competition, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1317, 1317 (1997) ("market vultures.., have swooped in and
gained a competitive edge by cashing in on the goodwill and reputation of well-known brand
name products").
142. See Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and its
Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393 (2003)
(arguing for a more inclusive mass-market concept and for narrow, targeted statutes); see, e.g.,
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667 (2001) (defining consumer leases).
143. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3504(b) (2005) (regulating advertising for ocean voyages).
144. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A
Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995) (arguing that form contracts allow
industries to exercise "private legislation").
145. See supra Part II.
146. Id.
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property, the Uniform Consumer Leases Act (UCLA) provides
protections to consumer lessees of personal property whether or not
the contract is established by a form contract. 47 It does not apply to
short term rental car contracts.' 48 While some states have legislation
regulating car rental companies, the protections are specific to
particular abuses that have received attention in the press such as the
abuse of global positioning systems to gather information about the
use of the car.
49
A. The Common Law of Unconscionability
and the Presumption of a Bargain
The presumption of the free bargain continues despite dramatic
changes in the context of bargaining and the legal rules selected by
one of the parties. Individual bargaining regarding the choice of
legal rules is now infrequent in consumer transactions, even when
those transactions involve significant expenditures. 5 The measured
cadence of the bargaining process that students read about in a
contracts class rarely appears in the real world of contracts today-at
least in consumer contracts. Standardized contracts dominate to a
large extent in a variety of contexts. 5' Standardization of terms
makes it possible to provide goods and services to a broader
audience than would be possible if contracts were negotiated
individually.'52 Though hints of the past customs of the clearly
denominated offer, followed by a clear counter-offer or acceptance
persist in modem real estate transactions and highly financed
transactions, these areas also present a continuing arch of develop-
ment that tends toward uniformity, inclusion of inapplicable clauses,
147. See UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT § 105 (Supp. 2006).
148. See 21 C.J.S. Consumer Protection § 24 (2006).
149. See Elizabeth C. Yen, Rent a Car, Rent a Spy: Governments React to New Uses for GPS,
14 BUS. L. TODAY 59 (July-Aug. 2005) (noting legislative responses to control the use of GPS
devises to enforce speeds and the ability to "kill" the ignition remotely).
150. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth
Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG L. REV. 265, 319 (1999)
("Inequality of bargaining power has removed the illusion of free bargaining .... ); see, e.g., Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the arbitration clause
contained in terms sent to the buyer in the box in which computer was shipped was binding on the
buyer).
151. See Slawson, supra note 125, at 529 ( "[S]tandard form contracts probably account for
more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made.").
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) ("standardization...
[is] essential to a system of mass production and distribution").
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and the convenient cookie-cutter approach that benefits the time and
options of the dominant party.'53
In short, real bargaining-in the sense of a demand for exclusion
or modification of a term-is nonexistent in modem consumer
transactions. This point is far from new-others have noted that the
consumer transaction of the twenty-first century is essentially
legislation by the dominant party.'54 While the situation of the
ordinary consumer is sometimes portrayed as a mater of choosing to
pay more or finding a different provider, the range of choice is
significantly restrained in today's market. Moreover, the modem
approach to standardized contracts dispenses entirely with the
assumption that society's default rules apply to a transaction except
insofar as those rules are mandatory, i.e., when alteration of the rules
renders a deal or aspect of the deal unconscionable.' The
orientation of courts in this area may well be affected by the
presumption or fiction of a bargain.
The most dramatic alteration of the legal landscape by form
contracts is allowing the dominant party to modify the default rules
without a need to bargain.' The analysis often presumes a protec-
tive legal baseline for consumers, even while allowing modification
of default rules.'57 At times, this presumption lacks substance.'58
This protective baseline no longer exists vis-a-vis reasonableness'59
because the interest of the law in policing the deal extends only to
unconscionability, which involves a significant burden of proof.6
The norms of today's market mean that if you do not like a clause,
you need to do without the product or service.
153. See infra Part VI.
154. Colloquy, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675,
700 (2005) (calling form contracting "private bureaucratic legislation").
155. See U.C.C. § 2A-108 (2003).
156. See Barnett, supra note 2.
157. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations Classroom:
Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV.
631, 646-47 (2000).
158. See, e.g., supra Part III.A (applying Article 2A to the rental car context). Nevertheless,
the existence of other proscriptive law is noted frequently in website information as well as in
Article 2A itself Id.
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f(1981).
160. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Fall 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:137
B. The Restatement Treatment of
Standardized Contracts and the Presumption of Social Utility
Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts articulates
the conventional justification for form contracts.' 6 ' It asserts that
standardization of agreements has utility for society and that, like
standardization of goods and services, it is "essential to a system of
mass production and distribution."' 62  The section notes that the
realities of the modem marketplace result in efficiencies and
savings."' Recognition that contemporary circumstances and norms
should be taken into account for the purpose of judging the use of
standardized clauses also suggests, however, that contemporary
circumstances should be considered in relation to all parties to the
contract, including the individual consumers involved in the deal."M
Items that may seem nonessential from one point of view or even a
luxury from a certain perspective may be critical to a person's job
and survival. Indeed, many consumer items are necessities of
modem existence. For example, computers and automobiles,
whether owned or rented by the consumer, are substantial purchases
and often essential to a person's ability to earn a living in today's
market.'65
Corporations experience utility from the persistence of this legal
fiction. It should be no surprise that when dealing with consumers as
a group, they constrain consumer choices in ways that maximize the
benefit to the dominant party, the repeat player.'66 In this context a
repeat player is a synonym for "dominant party." It is true that in a
literal sense, consumers may be repeat players: they rent cars
repeatedly, and some become knowledgeable about frequent flyer
points and other promotional bonuses. However, while consumers
are repeat players in the sense that they engage in the transaction
repeatedly, this status is meaningless in the context of bargaining or
private ordering. Mere repetition is not equivalent to that of the
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Special rules on the standards for modification apply in the area of third party
beneficiary doctrine and assignments. See id. §§ 336-338.
165. See, e.g., Johann Tasker, Have You Tamed the Technology?, FARMERS WEEKLY, April
21, 2006 (noting the importance of computers for farmers).
166. See Korobkin, supra note 6, at 1234.
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corporate lessors because the lessors are repeat players in a game
whose rules they control. The consumer is a repeat player in the
same sense that a person would be a repeat player in a game of
checkers with someone else who held all the pieces and could change
the rules of the game at any time.
Restatement section 211 adverts to this reality, noting the
"obvious danger of overreaching" in form contracts.'67 The evolving
world of the consumer market can be seen as the gradual change of
the conceptual framework of contracting. But the evolution of legal
doctrine can include mismatched concepts and persistence of a
standard that no longer comports with reality. For example, the
presumption of free bargaining in the market justifies a hands-off
approach to policing the formation of contracts, which is governed
by the doctrine of consideration. 6 ' However, when the presumption
of a bargained-for-exchange is not justified in a particular context,
continued use of a hands-off approach may result in an injustice to
the weaker party.'69 With consumer contracts, freedom of contract
relates almost exclusively to the dickered terms such as price and
delivery date. 7° The contract is thus supported by consideration and,
as to those terms, represents a bilateral arrangement of consent. All
other terms and conditions, however, are unilaterally drafted by the
dominant party.
The comment to Restatement section 211 gives some basis for
requiring reasonableness in form contracting. 7' It notes that despite
the general rule that parties are bound by terms in a standardized
contract even when they do not know the terms, they are not bound
by "unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation."' 72  The comment also establishes a standard of the
reasonable expectations of the average member of society,
suggesting that reasonableness has some bearing on the inquiry:
"Apart from government regulation, courts in construing and
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c.
168. See id. § 71.
169. See infra Part VI.
170. In the rental car context, even some dickered terms may not be the subject of meaningful
choice. For example, some rental car agreements alter the dickered term of the timing of the lease
by requiring that the renter return the car upon the request of the rental company, despite the
reference in the contract to a different date for return. See supra Part III.C.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f.
172. Id.
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applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable
expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it."' 3
However, these signals of a reasonableness standard are only part of
the picture.17 1 While the comment affords some room for
consideration of reasonableness, it does not consider the inequality of
bargaining power or the absence of meaningful choice for
consumers. 175  The primary message of section 211 is that
enforcement of form contracts is the general rule: "Apart from such
regulation, standard terms imposed by one party are enforced."'' 7
6
The Restatement also endorses an oft-used justification that
standardization of contracts "serves many of the same functions as
standardization of goods and services. '' 7 It analogizes the process
of contracting by forms with the process of mass production and
distribution.' Indeed, the phenomenon of dealing with people en
mass reaches every aspect of modern life. 79 However, standard form
contracts may even dispense with the default rules that establish a
foundation of minimal fairness. 8 The Restatement asserts that the
power to jettison default legal rules is one of the benefits of
standardization.' Even in cases in which the standard form contract
leaves default rules of contract law in place, the dominant party has
the power to change those rules in the future without triggering
judicial scrutiny at any higher level than the test of uncon-
scionability s2
173. Id. § 211 cmt. e.
174. Id. § 211 cmt. c.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 211 cmt. a
178. Id. (noting that like other forms of standardization in the modem world, form contracts
"are essential to a system of mass production and distribution.").
179. Even the law of due process dealing with government action that deprives individuals of
life, liberty or property has been profoundly affected by the perceived need to make decisions in
broad categories of people. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that an
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to terminating disability benefits when sufficient
administrative procedures existed to comport with due process). Scholars have called this new
approach to due process "mass justice." See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Dialogue for
Legal Multiculturalism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 879, 888 (2004) (noting the evolution of mass
justice in welfare).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a.
181. Id.
182. See U.C.C. § 2A-108 (2003) (stating that an unconscionable portion of a contract is
unenforceable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (noting that standard
terms are subject to the power of the court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or
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The comment to Restatement section 211 discusses the reasons
for the law's acceptance of standardization of contracts, the societal
risks associated with this acceptance, and the choice of an
unconscionability standard as the policing mechanism for
constraining the dominant party from violating the fairness norm that
underlies contract law."8 3 Comment (a) explains the utility of
standardization, as articulated above."4 Comment (b) recognizes the
reality of the relative bargaining power of each party."5 It notes that
the non-dominant party to a form contract assents to unknown terms,
relying on the good faith of the dominant party and that the purpose
of standardization is "to eliminate bargaining over details."' 86
Comment (b) also considers that the consumer relies on "the tacit
representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others
similarly situated" and assures that the agreement is subject to
limitations imposed by law.8 7
Comment (c) justifies the reconfiguration of what constitutes an
enforceable deal in the modern marketplace. 88 It notes the "obvious
danger of overreaching" in some contexts, suggesting an
understanding that the dominant party may draft terms that largely
favor that party--even to an unreasonable extent.'89 Indeed, given
the economic acknowledgement that rational actors will act to
maximize their own interest, one would be surprised to find form
contracts drafted to preserve a reasonable balance of power when the
law does not police the arrangement for reasonableness. The
protection of reasonableness is the general default rule set aside in
section 211 and justified in comment (a) as the (presumably
beneficial) reshaping of "legal rules which would apply in the
absence of agreement," combined with that bonus of being able to
use copies of the form "for purposes such as record-keeping,
coordination and supervision."' 90  Without question, this approach
term).
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmts. b, c.
184. Id. § 211 cmt. a.
185. Id. § 211 cmt. b.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. § 211 cmt. c.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 211 cmt. a.
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presents a bonanza of efficiency from the point of view of the
dominant party. A significant question remains, however, regarding
whether the choice of rejection of a reasonableness standard in favor
of the far less vigilant standard of unconsionability as the sole
method of policing the form contract sufficiently protects the good
faith bargain for the non-dominant party.
The appeal of utility rings hollow when we consider that the
only benefit to the non-dominant party is merely the ability to
bargain over terms relating to the subject matter of the contract, such
as the date of the lease, pricing, and whether the consumer can get a
sun roof.191 Under this regime, the defaults of the legal principles are
part of the details delegated for decision by the dominant party,
constrained only by the broad and lenient standard of
unconscionability. 1
92
The net effect strips the consumer of any protection against
unreasonable terms save the notably minimal protection of
unconscionability.' 93 The dominant party will likely draft a contract
to maximize its interests, even to a level of unreasonableness if it can
do so without stepping over the line into unconscionability. Indeed,
from an economic approach, the drafter will indulge in
unconscionable provisions unless the consequence is strong enough
to cancel out the benefits of unconscionability in cases in which the
consumer is likely to go to court.' 94 This line of economic analysis is
the basis for treble damages in consumer protection statutes. 95
The Restatement notes the existence of other law, such as
government regulation in some areas such as "insurance policies,
bills of lading, retail installment sales, small loans, and other
particular types of contracts."'96 The Restatement also expressly
declares the exceptional nature of government regulation as a
departure from and exclusive respite from the general rule it
191. See supra Part IV.A.
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-
Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (1998)
(arguing that it is extremely difficult for a party to a contract to persuade a court that an
arbitration clause is unconscionable).
195. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (describing congressional findings that various
consumer leases have been offered without adequate cost disclosures).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c.
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announces: "Apart from such regulation, standard terms imposed by
one party are enforced."'97 It acknowledges the possibility of other
moderating doctrines and the possible (though unlikely) tact of
separately negotiated terms.'98
Section 211 justifies the loss of bargaining by focusing on
meaningful details, such as the dickered terms.'99
Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of
transactions rather than to details of individual transactions.
Legal rules which would apply in the absence of agreement
can be shaped to fit the particular type of transaction, and
extra copies of the form can be used for purposes such as
record-keeping, coordination and supervision. Forms can be
tailored to office routines, the training of personnel, and the
requirements of mechanical equipment. Sales personnel and
customers are freed from attention to numberless variations
and can focus on meaningful choice among a limited
number of significant features: transaction-type, style,
quantity, price, or the like. Operations are simplified and
costs reduced, to the advantage of all concerned.2 °°
Certainly the use of standard form contracts saves time, at least
for the dominant player in this scenario. In a sense, it saves time for
the consumer in the scenario as well. Because negotiation is not
possible, the consumer saves the time that might otherwise be spent
in seeking concessions or changes in the free market model. Such
time savings do not necessarily represent a benefit, however, since
the market model creates the possibility that one or more of the
changes or concessions might be successful. On the other hand, the
consumer is likely to spend considerable time in the current form-
based approach comparing different contracts provided by different
vendors to see whether one or another offers more in terms of
consumer protection or less in the way of relinquishing reasonably
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. § 211 cmt. a.
200. Id. Comment (c) notes that "standard terms may be superseded by separately negotiated
or added terms (§ 203), they are construed against the draftsman (§ 206), and they are subject to
the overriding obligation of good faith (§ 205) and to the power of the court to refuse to enforce
an unconscionable contract or term (§ 208). Moreover, various contracts and terms are against
public policy and unenforceable." Id. § 211 cmt. c.
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expected rights."'
Real tensions exist between the perspectives and preferences of
people as individuals and as group members. One overlooked
perspective is found in the fact that the individual side of the quotient
also has a cumulative attribute that is often ignored. 2 Similar
tension is found in the interest of consumers in keeping insurance
costs low for the sake of securing low premiums. 3 It also appears in
the debate on tort reform and even in the constitutional liberty and
property interests referred to as the "utilitarian approach"-also a
mass justice issue. With respect to tort or insurance reform,
consumers may like the aspect of constrained payments to injured
parties from the view of lower premiums (or cost of goods), but a
necessary downside and less-discussed side of the quotient exists.
The relationship of benefits to individuals and benefits to society is
multi-dimensional. Consumers as insured parties may be pleased to
see limitations on awards to individuals who have suffered loss
because the effect on the consumer is (theoretically) a reduction in
the premium that consumers pay on insurance. Nevertheless, this
benefit has a correlative cost associated with it because their own
insurance coverage that consumers purchase no longer covers the full
loss insured. When the individual consumer suffers a loss and makes
a claim, his claim will be treated with the same limitations that saved
him money on the premium. The insurance may cost less, but it is
also worth less. The original reason for insurance (spreading the
loss) is compromised to the extent that insurance does not cover the
true loss to the individual. Similarly, tort reformers claim that con-
sumers in the market receive the benefit of a cost reduction for
products and services by virtue of reduction of awards to individuals
harmed by those goods and services. Consumers suffer a correlative
cost, however, because the cost of the product will not bear their own
loss if they are harmed by the product. Even people who suffer no
injury and make no claim absorb this cost because they carry a
201. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 700, 717 (1992).
202. See id. at 715-16.
203. See Slawson, supra note 125, at 530.
204. Carol I. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determination of Public Use and
Eminent Domain in Economic Development under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 43, 58-59
(2006).
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higher uninsured risk by virtue of the compromised tort system. Tort
reform that seeks to gain value for the consumer by denying in part
or in whole the claims of injured parties compromises two functions
of tort law: compensating the injured party and, additionally,
reducing negligence in the world. To the extent that tort law
incentivizes non-negligent conduct, reduction of compensation
reduces the effectiveness of that incentive. No one knows whether
the cost of negligence in the marketplace will fall on them
personally. Thus, through both tort liability principles and insurance,
members of society collectively share potential costs and benefits.
Reducing the benefit to the individual who has suffered actual harm
also reduces that potential benefit to each of us. These benefits are
the part of the original purpose of tort law and the insurance
mechanism and thus should be accorded some weight."5
The same considerations suggest that the preferences of
consumers are not entirely described by the Restatement. The
comment to Restatement § 211 also addresses default legal rules,
stating "[1]egal rules which would apply in the absence of agreement
can be shaped to fit the particular type of transaction. 2 °6  This
construct presents the opportunity for change of the otherwise
applicable legal rules as an unmitigated benefit to standard form
contracts. It certainly makes sense to assume that this change is
regarded as a benefit by one party to the contract, i.e., the party who
makes the change. It does not, however, make sense to assume that
supplanting legal default rules will have overriding social utility.
After all, the dominant party or repeat player drafts the forms and
can be expected to make changes in the default rules that favor its
side of the transaction. Whether such changes represent a social
benefit depends on the content of the rules prior to and after the
change. However, the comment takes the stance that social value
inheres in changing the default rules of contract law by the form
without regard to the content of the change. The likelihood of
consistent and pervasive change in favor of the dominant party, then,
seems clear.
In fact, the Restatement comment notes the likelihood of sharp
205. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. C.I.R., 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987) ("If the
insured has shifted its risk to the insurer, then a loss by or a claim against the insured does not
affect it because the loss is offset by the proceeds of an insurance payment.").
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
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practices or overreaching by the dominant party. The point is stated
as a bland and non-controversial truism:
The customer assents to a few terms, typically inserted in
blanks on the printed form, and gives blanket assent to the
type of transaction embodied in the standard form. He is
commonly not represented in the drafting, and the
draftsman may be tempted to overdraw in the interest of his
employer. The obvious danger of overreaching has resulted
in government regulation of insurance policies, bills of
lading, retail installment sales, small loans, and other
particular types of contracts. °7
The justification for such a broad assertion is that change shapes the
original default of the legal rule "to fit the particular type of
transaction." ' 8 The assumption is that the legal rules of contract law
are inappropriate for the specific type of contract that is subject to
standardization, which suggests that the applicable common law and
statutory law are too broad or simply wrong for thp contract at
hand. 9 This line of reasoning runs contrary to traditional decisional
law, especially in light of the fact that the presumption of utility in
this Restatement comment flows merely from change by the party
who drafts a form.2"' Thus, the statement accords deference and
presumes social utility based on utility to the drafter (generally the
dominant party).2 ' In this way, the Restatement's general
justification of change based on the needs of a "particular type of
transaction" overlooks the detailed evolution of the common law and
the specific considerations that have gone into the formation of
default rules.2"' Contract law represents the long-term development
of judicial and legislative determinations regarding fairness and
efficiency in various contexts.2"3 Changing these defaults should
only be done if the current default rules are somehow detrimental,
not because there is a generalized belief that the party drafting the
forms will choose a better rule.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 211 cmt. a.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See supra Part II.
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The comment also argues in favor of form contracts based on
trivial and one-sided considerations. 214  "Forms can be tailored to
office routines, the training of personnel, and the requirements of
mechanical equipment." '215  Thus, the American Law Institute
suggests that the benefit of having "extra copies of the form" for
"record-keeping, coordination and supervision" carries sufficient
weight to justify allowing the drafter to rewrite generations of law
regarding the appropriate balance of interests at issue.216
Additionally, the comment points out the benefit of "meaningful
choice": "Sales personnel and customers are freed from attention to
numberless variations and can focus on meaningful choice among a
limited number of significant features: transaction-type, style,
quantity, price, or the like. Operations are simplified and costs
reduced, to the advantage of all concerned. 217 Savings of time and
money are significant to both the overall market and individuals, but
whether such savings are achieved by "all concerned" is far from
clear.21 8 The rationale that the cost savings benefit everyone relies on
a type of group assessment of advantage rather than the loss incurred
by individuals signing the form. This analytical construct ignores
costs incurred by individuals, focusing instead on cumulative savings
of individuals who make up the group.219
C. Form Contracts under the UCC
The discussion above applying Article 2A to the context of
renting a car makes clear that Article 2A adopted the approach of
Article 2 to form contracts. 2 ' Although the UCC recognizes that the
"obligations of the parties are bilateral and the common law of
leasing is dominated by the need to preserve freedom of contract," it
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. The analytical move is similar to that of supporters of tort reform. See generally
"Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765,
1769-70 (1996) (discussing "common sense" tort reforms to cap or eliminate awards). The
argument that society will save money if it can foreclose costly tort claims overlooks the
cumulative losses to those who suffer injuries as a result of torts without full compensation. See
id. at 1780.
220. See supra Part III.A.
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accepts the unilateral nature of the terms and conditions of form
contracts.22' It relies on the fact that leases subject to Article 2A are
also "subject to any applicable ... rule of law that establishes a
different rule for consumers. ' 22  Although Article 2A leaves con-
sumer protection in lease transactions to other law, it imposes some
provisions that establish minimum standards of fairness and
reasonableness.223 It rejects, however, any default rule of reasonable-
ness, opting instead for the amorphous and lenient standard of
unconscionability as the only general policing mechanism.
224
V. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABLITY
The doctrine of unconscionablity comes into play as the outer
limit on the presumption of free bargaining.225 Parties are free to
enter uneven, unwise, or foolish bargains. 226 But there is a tipping
point at which the courts refuse to enforce a promise. Contracts that
are unconscionable are over the line in terms of unfair advantage to
one party.227
A. The Restatement Approach to Unconscionability
Section 208 of the Restatement articulates the limit provided by
the doctrine of unconscionability:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time
the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
228
Thus, the free market ideal has a limit. The system of contracting
adopted in the United States presumes fair bargaining in the absence
221. U.C.C. § 2A-101 (2003).
222. Id. § 2A-104.
223. Id. § 2A-108.
224. Id.
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); see also U.C.C. §§ 2A-108,
2-302.
226. See, e.g., Morris v. Capital Furniture & Appliance Co., Inc., 280 A.2d 775, 777 (D.C.
1971) (upholding a conditional sale contract for household items even though the buyer was
obligated to pay $832.00 for goods that cost the seller only $234.35).
227. See U.C.C. § 2A-108.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
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of fraud or unconscionability.229 It leaves the policing of contract
formation to the more limited standard of bad faith in negotiation.23 °
The effect of this default rule is to provide judicial enforcement of
contracts unless the party opposing enforcement can meet the burden
of showing bad faith on the part of the other. 3
Restatement section 208 takes a position of compromise on the
issue of unequal bargaining power as a factor in unconscionability.
211
Comment (d) notes that a showing of inequality of bargaining power
does not establish that a contract is unconscionable.233 The comment
also indicates that extreme situations of "gross inequality of
bargaining power" may be a factor in determining that a contract
provision is unconscionable, since the non-dominant party has
neither a viable alternative nor an opportunity to negotiate unfair
terms .34
Likewise, in the context of standardized contracts, courts often
enforce a term even though it is the result of unequal bargaining,
except when the court regards the term as unconscionable or against
public policy.235  On the topic of "Standardized Agreements,"
Restatement section 211 recognizes that parties do not read or
bargain over the terms because they know that the deal offered is a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition.236 The terms offered are not subject to
change.237  As section 211 states, "[o]ne of the purposes of
standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual
transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial
number of customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard
terms. '"238
229. See id.
230. See U.C.C. § 2-607.
231. See id.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d.
233. See id. ("A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker
party.").
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Ilan v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 632 F.Supp. 886, 891 (D.N.Y. 1985)
("Even a contract that is the result of unequal bargaining power will be enforced unless its terms
are unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy.").
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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B. Unconscionability under the UCC
The common law doctrine of unconscionablity is codified under
the UCC. 9 UCC sections 2A-108 and 2-302 echo the common law
doctrine of unconscionability set forth in Restatement section 208.140
The UCC section 2-302 makes clear that the doctrine of
unconscionablity exists to provide a limit on the freedom of parties
to alter the legal principles that apply to contracts.24'
The comment notes the frequent need to consider
unconscionability in the context of standard form contracts.242
Interestingly, the comment sets the scope of the issue to exclude the
question of leverage or market power of the dominant party:
The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power. The basic test is
whether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
term or contract involved is so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time
of the making of the contract.
2 43
Thus, the UCC isolates the question of unconscionability from the
issue of leverage, leaving the consumer in an untenable position in
many cases.2 4
C. Unconscionability in UCC Article 2
UCC section 2-302 explains policing the sale of goods and
adopts the common law approach in a fairly brief and straightforward
manner:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
239. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-108, 2-302 (2003).
240. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
241. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. The comment notes that the section "makes it possible for a
court to police explicitly against the contracts or terms which the court finds to be unconscionable
instead of attempting to achieve the result by an adverse construction of language, by
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by a determination that the term is contrary
to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any term thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.245
Thus, Article 2 endorses considerable flexibility with regard to
policing against unconscionable outcomes.
D. Unconscionability in UCC Article 2A
UCC section 2A-108 carries forward the same principles and
tests of section 2-302 to the leasing of goods.246 It constructs a rule
of unconscionablity substantially similar to UCC 2-302 although it
presents a more cautious approach to the issue in some settings.247 In
its totality, UCC section 2A-108 states as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract
or any clause of a lease contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a
matter of law finds that a lease contract or any clause of a
lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct
or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the
collection of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court
may grant appropriate relief.
(3) Before making a finding of unconscionability under
subsection (1) or (2), the court, on its own motion or that of
a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to
245. Id. § 2-302.
246. See id. § 2A-108
247. Id.
Fall 2006]
176 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 40:137
present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the
lease contract or clause thereof, or of the conduct.
(4) In an action in which the lessee claims
unconscionability with respect to a consumer lease:
(a) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection (1) or
(2), the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the
lessee.
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee
claiming unconscionability has brought or maintained an action
the lessee knew to be groundless, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the party against which the claim
is made.
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of the recovery
on behalf of the claimant under subsections (1) and (2) is not
controlling.248
Both sections 2-302 and 2A-108 authorize courts to refuse to
enforce contracts in whole or in part based on unconscionability.2 49
The first subsections of the two provisions are substantially identical
in content. The provisions both require a finding of uncon-
scionability "as a matter of law," setting a high standard for judicial
interference with contract terms. 251  Both sections allow a court to
refuse enforcement when the unconscionability existed "at the time"
the contract was made.252 In the first section of each pro-vision, the
court may also "limit" the application of the uncon-scionable part of
the contract ("term" or "clause") to "avoid any unconscionable
result.
253
The scope of the inquiry set by each provision is substantially
similar.5 4  The two provisions each require that the court afford
parties an opportunity "to present evidence" relating to the putative
unconscionability of the agreement.255 Subsection (3) of 2A-108 sets
248. Id.
249. See id. §§ 2A-108, 2-302.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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a standard substantially similar to that of subsection (2) of 2-302.2s6
Subsection (2) states: "If it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any term thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
determination." '257  This provision provides the standard of a
"reasonable opportunity to present evidence. 258  Likewise,
subsection (3) of UCC 2A-108 sets a standard of reasonable
opportunity to present evidence relating to the bargain.259 It states:
"Before making a finding of unconscionability... the court, on its
own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect
of the lease contract or clause thereof, or of the conduct.
26
1
Although the formulation of this language is different than that of
subsection 2-302, it presents the same test of a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence.26' In addition to the reasonable
opportunity standard, each section defines the inquiry as relating to
"setting, purpose, and effect" of the lease contract or clause.262
Subsection 2-302 uses the formulation of "commercial setting,
purpose, and effect" to describe the scope of the evidence to be
considered by the court.26 3  Subsection 2A-108 omits the term
"commercial" from the list of "setting, purpose, and effect," giving
the same description of relevant evidence that the party must have a
reasonable opportunity to present. 2' Thus, the description of the
scope of the evidence to be considered by the court is identical in
subsections 2-302 and 2A-108. 265 The official comment to section
2A-108 notes that subsection (1) of 2A-108 is "taken almost
verbatim from the provisions of section 2-302(1). "1266 Additionally, it
notes that subsection (3) of 2A-108 is "taken from the provisions of
256. Id.
257. Id. § 2-302(2).
258. Id.
259. Id. § 2A-108(3).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. § 2-302(2).
264. Id. § 2A-108(3).
265. See id. §§ 2A-108, 2-302.
266. Id. § 2A-108 cmt.
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section 2-302(2)," and that subsection (3) "has been expanded to
cover unconscionable conduct. 267
Although the language and basic purpose of the provisions on
unconscionability in Article 2 and Article 2A are similar, the
provisions include some significant differences. UCC 2-302 in its
entirety provides essentially the same language and test as
subsections (1) and (3) of 2A-108.268  An important difference
between the sections is that 2A-108 sets forth two additional
subsections, providing more detail and context than is present in
UCC 2-302.269 Subsection (2) of UCC 2-108 focuses on the issue of
unfair process in the specific setting of consumer leases.27° It states:
With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of
law finds that a lease contract or any clause of a lease
contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or
that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection
of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court may grant
appropriate relief.
27'
This subsection authorizes a court to "grant appropriate relief' when
it finds a lease contract or clause was "induced by unconscionable
conduct." '272  The subsection also provides general language
authorizing such relief when "unconscionable conduct has occurred
in the collection of a claim. '273  Subsection (4) to UCC 2A-108
provides for attorney's fees when a court finds a lessor acted
unconscionably in a consumer lease. 274 The subsection also requires
attorney's fees in favor of a lessor charged with unconscionability
when the court "does not find unconscionability" and finds that the
lessee claiming unconscionability "brought or maintained an action
the lessee knew to be groundless. 275 Subsection (4) expressly notes
that attorney's fees are not controlled by "the amount of the recovery
267. Id.
268. See id. §§ 2A-108, 2-302.
269. Id.
270. Id. § 2A-108(2).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. § 2A-108(4).
275. Id.
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on behalf of the claimant." '276
E. Exclusion of the Factor of Bargaining Leverage
UCC section 2-302 limits the scope of the issue to exclude
leverage or market power of the dominant party and notes that the
principle "is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power. "277 Considering the exclusion, the predictable
next step in the evolution of form contracts may be a move toward
greater clarity. In the past, courts have rejected the effect of a
standard form based on the theory that the lessee had no reason to
know its purported effect. 278 Giving the consumer more information
about the terms in a clear and straightforward manner may dispense
with the argument that the consumer was unaware of a provision that
would have been a deal breaker. The Internet seems to provide the
optimal forum to foreclose an argument by a consumer that he did
not know or understand a term. In the terms of 2A-108, it is less
likely that a court will find "as a matter of law" that a lease was
"induced by unconscionable conduct" when the term is available on
the Internet for anyone diligent enough to read the online posting.279
This reasoning fails to note the reality that consumers are not
motivated to read provisions when they have no power to bargain for
an alteration of the term.28 ° One might argue that the consumer could
reject the arrangement with the offending party and enter a contract
with another car rental company. The problem with this argument is
that it is unlikely that the consumer will find a company that presents
a form without the same term or other terms that are equally onerous
from the consumer's point of view.28'
Some of the forms present provisions in clear language that tell
the consumer the effect of the contract, effectively preventing an
argument under UCC 2A-108(2). Arguably, the renter should know
276. Id.
277. Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
278. See, e.g., Magliozzi v. P & T Container Service Co., Inc., 614 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993) (noting lessee had no reason to know ticket purported to be a contract).
279. SeeU.C.C. § 2A-108.
280. See, e.g, Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943).
281. See supra Part III.B (explaining the similarity among the terms available for various car
rental companies).
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the effect of the agreement because it is so plainly communicated to
him on the Internet site or in the printed terms and conditions. In the
language of Restatement section 211, the dominant party would not
have "reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would
not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term
' 282
since the renter has full access to the provisions so clearly stated that
he should understand them fully. Thus, the disputed term should be
included as part of the agreement.
VI. THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS
Although the test of consideration plays a role in preventing
state domination of contracting, even traditional contract doctrine
recognizes that the hands-off approach represented by the doctrine of
consideration is not appropriate in all contexts. In some contexts,
such as modification and covenants not to compete, contract law
employs a more demanding standard to scrutinize the deal. Not all
promises are judged by the test of consideration alone. For example,
courts judge modified contracts by a reasonableness standard or a
good faith standard.283 Similarly, under both Article 2 and 2A, the
basis for considering that a party's expectation of receiving due
performance may be impaired is judged by a reasonableness
standard. 284 Likewise, the party seeking to enforce a covenant not to
compete must establish that the covenant is fair and reasonable,
making these contracts subject to a higher standard of proof. In these
and other contexts, the law judges whether a contract is fair and
reasonable.285  The difference between these areas and the typical
question of whether the deal is supported by consideration arises
from recognition that the market does not operate freely in these
areas. 286 For example, in the modification context, the baseline of the
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
283. The text of UCC Section 2-209(1) dispenses with consideration as a requirement for
modified sales contracts but the official comments to the section impose a requirement that
modifications be in good faith to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) & cmt. 2. Section 89 of
the Second Restatement of Contracts sets forth alternative grounds for enforcement of a
modification. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89. The thrust of the requirements is
that to be enforceable, modifications must pass a test more rigorous than consideration. Id. For
example, it provides that a modification is enforceable if it is "fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made." Id.
284. See U.C.C. §§ 2-609 and 2A-401.
285. Id.
286. For example, adequate assurance of performance may be required when the normal
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contract already establishes each party's original assessment of the
deal.2"7 Changes to the contract are not viewed on a par with the
original deal because the parties have generally invested in the deal,
want to hold the deal together, and are not able to revive other bids
without undue cost.
288
If the parties lack freedom to bargain, however, refusing to
judge the content of the bargain can operate to hold parties to
bargains that are far from fair or reasonable. The presumption of
fairness that has attached to the bargained-for-exchange as a check
on government power is far less defensible in a context in which the
attribute of a bargain is absent. The consumer, as the non-dominant
party, may have no realistic choice in the matter since other rental
agreements on the market may include the same or other, equally
undesirable terms. Likewise, determining the content of various form
agreements presented by other corporate lessors involves significant
time and effort on the part of the consumer. Additionally, the
concept of unconscionability has a comparative aspect, making it
difficult for a party who agrees to a term as part of an agreement to
argue effectively that the term is unconscionable, especially if that
term is standard in the industry 89
Comparison of these points of reality from the consumer's
perspective argues for moderation of the system of mass contracting.
The pace of a mass production market may render individual
contracting impossible.29 ° However, the needs of a mass production
market do not necessarily mean that a standard of reasonableness for
judging such contracts would be impossible in the current system.
The need to facilitate a mass production market means that
contracting must be streamlined.91 It does not suggest, however, that
the more rigorous test of reasonableness is impossible or that the
relationship between contracting parties begins to break down such as if buyer is late on
payments or if seller fails to deliver the goods on time. See U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. (noting that
neither party is free to stop performance without being in breach).
287. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. a ("like offers and guarantees,
such adjustments are ancillary to exchanges").
288. See generally, DiMatteo, supra note 150, at 303-07.
289. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. ("The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the term or
contract involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable.").
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a.
291. Id.
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presumption of a fair bargain of today's contract law strikes the best
balance that mass contracting can achieve. Despite clear indications
that Article 2A is not primarily a consumer protection statute, it
includes some rules that provide policing of contracts in the area
because the statutory terms "may not be varied by agreement in the
case of a consumer lease. ' 29 2 Such terms relate to warranties in con-
sumer leases, 293 limitations on recovery of consequential damages
from a consumer in a consumer lease contract,294 limits on choice of
law,295 and the prohibition against acceleration at will.296 Extension
of the philosophy supporting these controls would provide efficient
policing without significant burden on the judiciary. Moreover, the
use of such limits are not subject to the criticism that may apply to a
broad test of reasonableness, that is, that inclusion of a reasonable-
ness standard would undermine certainty for lessors, and, thus,
would impose costs and inefficiencies on the system.
VII. CONCLUSION
Article 2A and modem contract law endorse unilateral private
ordering by form contracts, accepting the presumption of free
bargaining to justify a hands-off approach and minimal judicial scru-
tiny of such transactions. Although form contracts are bilateral in the
sense of consideration, they present unilateral private ordering with
regard to contract terms. Thus, consumers who wish to retain the
standard default rules of contract law-such as the recovery of
consequential damages or judicial resolution of disputes-have no
choice but to forego the deal.
The presumption that form contracts present the same social
utility associated with mass production-the standard justification
for such arrangements-accepts the process as a cumulative good. 97
Arguably, the fact-intensive and time-consuming enterprise of
reviewing form transactions in a meaningful way militates against
serious judicial scrutiny of form contracts except by the most porous
292. U.C.C. § 2A-104 cmt. 4 (1987) (amended 2003).
293. Id. § 2A-214 (quoting the language necessary to disclaim warranties including
"merchantability" and "the implied warranty of fitness" in a consumer lease).
294. Id. § 2A-530.
295. Id. § 2A-106.
296. Id. § 2A-109.
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
GOT WHEELS?
test such as the test of unconscionablity. Thus, the dominant party's
choice of legal rules is seen as a reduction in costs that is an
"advantage of all concerned. g2  It may be that consumers are the
beneficiaries of lower costs of products and services because of the
efficiency of form contracting. The presumption that consumers
willingly trade reasonable terms for lower prices fails to take into
account the loss to individual consumers and the aggregate loss of
consumers' ability to seek an alteration in a term or to enjoy knowing
that dictated terms are subject to a reasonableness test. While the use
of forms by corporations provides empirical evidence of their
preference on the issue, little information is available on the
preference of consumers.
Standardized contracting is inevitable in today's fast paced,
world-wide markets. Individual negotiation of contract terms is as
much a thing of the past as physician house calls or looking for the
union label. Nevertheless, the current standard for judging such
contracts is not necessarily inevitable or the best for balancing the
competing needs of consumers and businesses. Article 2A limits the
ability of parties to agree to some significant terms such as
acceleration clauses and forum selection clauses. An expansion of
the technique of limiting the scope of choice in other areas such as
arbitration could level the playing field and provide protection
against the clear possibility of overreaching by the party drafting the
forms. Given the power of subtle changes in legal mechanisms, it is
worthwhile to consider whether moderation of the legal test for
enforceability could achieve a better balance than is possible under
an approach of unilateral private ordering.
298. See id.
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TABLE 1. CAR RENTAL COMPANIES
COMPANY URL/ PHONE # ACCESS TO
NAME CLAUSES
Thrifty http://www.thrifty.com/abo Online
ut/generalpolicies.aspx
(general policies)
Customer Service: 1-800-
847-4389
Budget https://www.budget.com/b Online
udgetWeb/html/en/cust
omer/rentalpolicies/ren
talpolicies.html
Customer service: 1-800-
214-6094
Enterprise http://www.enterprise.com/ Pick up at
carrental/home.do Location
Internet Tech Line: 1-877-
858-3884
Hertz http://www.hertz.com Reserve
Web Assistance: 1-877- vehicle
826-8782
Avis http://www.avis.com/Avis Online (63
Web/JSP/global/en/pro pages)
grams/consumer/Pref
MbrGlobalTermsMidd
le.jsp (preferred terms)
Customer Service: 1-800-
352-7900
NationalCar www.nationalcar.com Reserve
(only online) Webmaster: 1-888-501- vehicle
9010
Alamo www.alamo.com > rental Online
policies > select
Customer Service
Customer Service: 1-800-
462-5266
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TABLE 1. CAR RENTAL COMPANIES (CONT.)
COMPANY URL/PHONE # ACCESS TO
NAME CLAUSES
Dollar http://www.dollar.com/abo Online
ut/general-policies.asp
x?r=fac4ad5aad642c0
876b 1 c21 ecc62d97
(general policies)
Reservation Center: 1-800-
800-3665
Advantage http://www.arac.com/terms Online
Rent-A-Car .htm (terms)
(ARAC) Customer Service: 1-800-
777-5524
Payless www.paylesscarrental.com Reserve
(only online) Customer Service: 727- vehicle
321-6352
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